Patching every system that touches a vulnerable path is a minimum-vertex-cover problem. Searching a constrained keyspace is Grover's home turf. And randomness — the foundation under every key you cut — can be drawn from a quantum coin instead of an algorithm.
You cannot patch everything this quarter. Minimum vertex cover finds the fewest systems that touch every risky edge — formulated as a QUBO, sampled with QAOA.
Grover's quadratic speedup applies to constraint-satisfaction search, not just toy lookups. Our Sudoku-as-CSP program shows the oracle pattern your analysts would reuse.
Pseudo-random is an algorithm wearing a blindfold. A measured qubit is not. Our extractor pipeline turns raw quantum bits into certified-grade output — and says plainly that only real hardware makes that claim true.
Your dependency graph, your patch windows, your search problem — written down as cover sets and oracles with your security team in the room.
The programs run in the lab against your anonymised topology; results are sample distributions you can audit line by line.
What quantum changes for you now (optimisation, randomness), what it changes later (Shor), and your post-quantum migration reading list — pursue, park, or drop.
These programs are published in our algorithm library. The numbers below come from recorded executions we can reproduce on demand.
Minimum vertex cover over an attack-surface graph.
Measured: Sampled covers concentrated on the true minimum.
Grover search over a constraint-satisfaction oracle.
Measured: The satisfying assignment dominates the measurement distribution.
Raw quantum bits through a randomness extractor.
Measured: The item states plainly: only real hardware makes the bits non-pseudo-random.
Results are from the library items' own recorded runs on our simulator — the same one your browser uses.
Said plainly before anything else: PQC runs on the computers you already own. The quantum machine is the threat model, not the tool — nothing in this section needs a single qubit to deploy.
An adversary who records your encrypted traffic today never has to break it today. RSA and elliptic-curve key exchange fall to Shor's algorithm on the day a large fault-tolerant machine exists — so ciphertext captured now is a bet on when that day comes. If your data must stay secret longer than that machine takes to arrive, the public-key encryption protecting it in transit is already the weak link.
These are lattice and hash mathematics for ordinary CPUs. Major browsers already negotiate hybrid ML-KEM key exchange in TLS, and NIST's draft transition guidance (IR 8547) puts classical public-key cryptography on a path to deprecation after 2030 and removal after 2035. The migration has started — quietly, in software.
Find every place a key is cut with RSA, ECC or DH — TLS endpoints, VPNs, code signing, PKI, firmware, long-lived archives. Most organisations are surprised by their own list.
Rank each use by how long its data must stay secret. Ten-year secrets crossing public networks migrate first; short-lived session traffic can wait its turn.
Deploy ML-KEM alongside your current key exchange, the way TLS already does — nothing gets weaker while everything gets safer. Build the crypto-agility that makes the next swap a configuration change.
Re-scan, test interoperability, and record what moved and what remains exposed — a document your auditors and your board can both read.
New public-key algorithms believed hard for classical and quantum attackers alike. Standardised, already shipping in mainstream TLS stacks, deployable across VPNs, signing and PKI today. This — not quantum hardware — is what a migration installs. We do not sell it: the standards are public and your existing vendors implement them.
Two parties grow a shared key from single qubits; an eavesdropper shows up as a measured error rate climbing toward 25%. It needs dedicated point-to-point links and still needs classical authentication — a complement to PQC, not a substitute. Our Lab runs a faithful in-browser simulation of the protocol's statistics, free: the clearest way we know to show why quantum changes key exchange.
Both get called "quantum-safe". They are different things — when a vendor blurs them, ask which one they mean.
The quantum computing behind the threat, taught properly: superposition to Shor, period finding, and why bigger RSA keys don't help — so your engineers argue from understanding, not headlines.
bb84-key-exchange runs end to end in your browser on the free simulator — with and without an eavesdropper. And Shor's period-finding, the mathematics that makes migration necessary, runs for real on the platform: our use-case demo factors 15 = 3 × 5, free on roro.sim.sv. No credits, no queue.
We run the four-step assessment with your security team and put the verdict in writing — including "you have time" where that is the honest answer. We will not pretend you need our machines to deploy ML-KEM.
Shor's algorithm does not threaten your RSA keys this year — and anyone who says otherwise is selling something. It stays a reading item in our library until machines catch up, clearly labelled.
Anonymised topology is enough — an engineer replies with the cover formulation.